Business and Economic Commentary By Christopher Ram
Part One of Two: The cost of an electoral institution
In January 2012, I questioned whether Guyana received value for money from its elections machinery. In 2015, I noted that the cost per vote had risen from G$520 in 1997 to G$24,746 in 2011. My concern extended beyond polling-day costs to sustaining an institution seldom subjected to financial scrutiny. Fourteen years later, the questions remain unanswered and the sums have multiplied.
The subject now requires two articles. This first examines how a temporary Elections Commission became permanent, its costs across five-year General Election and three-year Local Government Election cycles, and whether expenditure has been audited. The second addresses the commissioners: their remuneration, attendance, performance, the Commission’s paralysis and the case for replacing the present arrangement. Before examining its governors, we should establish what taxpayers pay for the institution.
From temporary oversight to permanent institution
Before 1992, Article 161 of the 1980 Constitution provided for a chairman appointed by the President and one commissioner representing each party holding at least five seats in the National Assembly. Appointments were tied to an election and ordinarily ended three months afterwards. The 1985 Commission had three members, but a separate National Registration Commission handled voter registration, identification cards and other administration. Comparisons with today’s GECOM must include both bodies’ costs.
The earlier system was hardly a golden age. Beginning in 1968, the electoral system was compromised and corrupted, largely to deliver whatever results the PNC wanted. To his discredit, Hoyte joined in that process to deliver one of the most discredited elections in 1985. Enter the Carter Center whose reforms included a formula for GECOM of three government nominees, three opposition nominees and a chairman. It was a political compromise intended to restore confidence, not an arrangement suitable for all time. The Commission remained temporary for the 1992 and 1997 elections. In 2000, constitutional amendments made it permanent, while retaining its politically divided composition and consolidating important electoral responsibilities under it.
The need for continuity in electoral administration was never in question. What was questionable was the decision to make a politically constituted Commission permanent. Registration systems, trained staff, secure records and election planning cannot be reconstructed from nothing every five years. But a permanent professional secretariat is not the same thing as a permanently politicised governing commission. The question, after more than a quarter-century, is whether the benefits of continuity required this particular structure and its recurring costs.
The full cost of an electoral cycle
GECOM costs tons of money between elections: staff, commissioners, accommodation, technology, registration and transport. An election-year allocation is therefore incomplete. We must examine expenditure across the entire cycle, separating election costs from the organisation’s standing costs.
A reconstruction of the Ministry of Finance’s published estimates for GECOM, Agency 11, indicates expenditure of approximately G$11.18 billion in 2011–2015, G$16.63 billion in 2016–2020 and G$18.73 billion in 2021–2025, giving a fifteen-year total of G$46.53 billion. Original budgetary allocations over the same period amounted to approximately G$61.98 billion, a difference of G$15.45 billion, or almost 25%. These figures are drawn from published budget estimates rather than a complete series of separately audited GECOM accounts, and the 2025 expenditure is revised rather than final. Supplementary appropriations and other adjustments must therefore be reconciled before conclusions can be drawn about unspent funds. Nevertheless, the figures raise serious questions about the reliability of GECOM’s budgeting and financial management. More fundamentally, what has Guyana received in return for G$46.53 billion in reported expenditure, and where is the independent audit evidence demonstrating that this enormous expenditure represented value for money?
This does not mean G$46.5 billion was wasted. Elections were held and registers maintained. But what did expenditure achieve, why did costs change, and how much supported the permanent establishment rather than elections? It would be equally misleading to divide every five-year total by the votes cast in the final year and call the result the cost of a vote. The 2011–2015 period, for example, included two General Elections, whereas the next two periods included one each.
GECOM has never bothered with indulging in this level of accountability.
Local elections and value for money
Local Government Elections are intended to follow a three-year cycle, although postponements have disrupted that timetable. Elections were held in 2016, 2018 and 2023. Allocations were also made in years when anticipated elections did not take place. How much was actually spent preparing for postponed polls, what was surrendered, and what additional costs followed the delays? Because the same staff, premises and equipment serve both local and national elections, their costs cannot simply be added together. A meaningful examination would identify direct costs and allocate shared expenditure fairly. But GECOM has shown little appetite for this level of accountability.
Guyana’s geography makes elections expensive. Remote communities, rivers and difficult transport routes cannot be ignored in international comparisons. But these challenges make rigorous procurement, sound planning and independent performance auditing more necessary, not less. A proper value-for-money review would examine staffing, commissioners’ benefits, registration and technology expenditure, procurement and operational readiness, and establish what improvements the public has obtained.
Where are the audited accounts?
Article 223(2) of the Constitution places constitutional commissions within the Auditor General’s audit mandate. Yet a straightforward public account remains elusive: for each year, which GECOM financial statements were audited, when, with what opinion, and where are the reports? The Audit Office’s published register gives GECOM the puzzling notation ‘Established as at 2015’ rather than a clear last-audit year. That does not prove no audit work occurred, but it calls for a transparent record of completed audits.
Reporting spending in the national accounts is no substitute for examining internal controls, programmes and economy. GECOM should identify the financial statements prepared; the Audit Office should identify the audits completed and their findings. The Audit Office warrants separate treatment; taxpayers need credible evidence to assess value for money.
This time, it is the Auditor General, the Public Accounts Committee and the Parliament which have not bothered about their constitutional authority.
Who is asking the questions?
GECOM needs far more than post-elections scrutiny by the Private Sector Commission, always eager to pronounce on election results, but not on cost control and efficiency. What has the Public Accounts Committee done to establish the state of GECOM’s audits, and why has Parliament continued to approve substantial estimates without a fuller public accounting of results? The President, Government and Opposition bear responsibility for the structure they preserve, as much as for the conduct of an election.
That international observers noted improvements in the 2025 polls does not distinguish between a reasonably managed polling day and a sound institution. The arrangement devised for the 1992 return to democracy should not survive indefinitely merely because political parties have become comfortable with it. Guyana needs independent, professional election administration, not an expensive political compromise preserved without proof of its worth. Part Two will examine the leadership and performance of those who occupy the Commission.
Next week we turn our attention to the Commissioners themselves and their apparent concern with their personal interests rather than with the public good and their constitutional obligations.
Source: Kiskadee Watch
